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The article begins by briefly reviewing agricultural risk management strategies used by farm households and 
some of the unique problems associated with agricultural insurance. Especially, the experience of developed
countries is highlighted to make the case for why such approaches cannot work well in lower-income countries. The
article introduces innovations that use index-based insurance products, and gives a pricing model for weather index 
derivatives which is deduced with utility-based pricing, and then, the article reviews both the advantages and 
disadvantages of index-based agricultural insurance and its applicable scope.
2. Agricultural risk management and insurance
The strategies of agricultural risk management generally can be categorized as risk mitigation, risk transfer, risk 
diversification, and management of retained risk. But these strategies all have drawback respectively. It is highly 
likely that risk management strategies also vary over time as a function of farm household experience, the regulatory 
environment and changing risk attitudes among other factors. These risk management strategies may be
complementary, as seen in the US crop insurance experience (Glauber, 2004)[1], but in the absence of risk transfer, 
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risk mitigation and risk coping strategies may potentially be overwhelmed by catastrophic loss events. Building 
systems whereby insurance transfers highly correlated and catastrophic losses out of the community, and banks and 
non-banking institutions facilitate savings and borrowing to assist in coping with more frequent and less severe 
events, is at the core of designing effective systems for agricultural output risk.
Insurance is a commonly used risk-transfer mechanism for property damage throughout the developed world, and
in many lower-income countries. But many different insurance products applied in developed countries are not true 
for lower-income countries due to the transaction cost of delivering insurance products to economically small rural
households is simply too great in lower-income countries. 
Agricultural production losses, especially due to weather events, tend to be characterized by some degree of 
positive spatial correlation, since weather patterns are generally similar over large geographic areas. Thus, the 
degree of positive correlation is often inversely related to the size of the region under consideration: relatively small 
(large) countries are likely characterized by more (less) positively correlated agricultural losses. In recent years,
various capital market instruments have developed for transferring highly correlated weather risks or risks
associated with natural disasters (Doherty, 2000; Skees, 1999)[2][3]. In general, agricultural production losses are 
typically neither uncorrelated nor highly positively correlated (Skees and Barnett, 1999)[4].
Besides the lack of statistical independence, agricultural insurance is often plagued by high administrative costs
which spatially correlated risk, moral hazard, adverse selection, and high administrative costs are all important
reasons why agricultural insurance markets may fail. If consumers fail to recognize and plan for low-frequency,
high-consequence events, the likelihood that an insurance market will emerge diminishes, so the consumer may
have difficulty determining the value of the contract (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2001)[5]. The evaluation of probability
assessments regarding future events is complex and often entails high search costs. On the other hand, insurers will 
typically load premium rates heavily for low-frequency, high-consequence events where considerable ambiguity 
surrounds the actual likelihood of the event (Schade et al., 2002; Kunreuther et al., 1995)[6][7]. A very common 
problem in lower-income countries is that uncertainty is further compounded when the historical data used to 
estimate probability distributions are incomplete or of poor quality.
Together, functioning private-sector markets may fail to materialize or, if they do materialize, they may cover 
only a small portion of the overall risk exposure (Pomareda, 1986)[8].
3. Innovation in managing production risk: weather index
Index insurance products offer some potential new solutions to help mitigate several aspects of the problems
outlined above (Skees et al., 1999)[3]. Index products also facilitate risk transfer into financial markets where 
investors acquire index contracts as another investment in a diversified portfolio. A suitable index requires that the 
random variables measured meet these criteria: observable and easily measured; objective; Transparent;
independently verifiable; reportable in a timely manner; and stable and sustainable over time.
Weather derivatives is a financial instrument for avoiding weather risk, and it spreads fast recently because of its’
unique advantage of diversifying and transferring risk. Weather risk refers that drastic fluctuations of production 
cost and then the market demand which result from uncertain weather condition can lead an uncertain cash flow and 
profit. Disastrous weather can be led directly by typhoon, whirlwind, thunderstorm, and storm wind etc, and even 
weather change such as temperature, rainfall, sunshine and frost all could lead tremendous uncertainty of income of 
economic entity. Weather derivatives appeared in U.S.A at the earliest. At 1999, CME listed weather derivatives for 
transaction, and has gradually been developing several products, including HDD (Heating-Degree-Day) and CDD 
(Cooling-Degree-Day) and GDD (Growth- Degree-Day) etc. derivatives products so far. The market of weather 
derivatives has become the financial market which has the fastest speed of developing in EURO and Japan. In 2005, 
more than 360 hundred millions dollars come into CME and some company held under the contractual weather 
derivatives transaction volume of 80 ten thousands hands and the contract sum of 210 hundred millions dollars in 
2006.
Temperature indicator is the most standard in all kinds of weather indicators, temperature risk is that too high or 
too low temperature can seriously influence the growth of all kinds of crop. So weather index is the most active in 
numerous weather derivatives products. The main weather index future is HDDs and CDDs. In American, the 
average temperature is 18.3đ, when temperature of a certain day is lower than it, there can be conducted HDDs, 
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otherwise, there can be conducted CDDs, in a given period, we can hold the two index through following two 
functions:
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Where the D is a given durative days. Naturally, all of crops need a given accumulated temperature which must 
achieve a certain level to meet certain quality and output.
The theory of expected utility which proposed by Von Newman is a specification of decision make under an 
uncertainty condition. The theory deems that if a decision maker chooses the best plan from some given alternatives 
subjects to utility axiom, he must choose the plan which has can give him the most utility. The article is to apply the 
method to price the weather index. Presuming an individual has a utility function as
2( ) ( ) ( )U x E x xl s= -                                                                                                                              (2)
Where the l is coefficient of risk aversion and 0l > . There are three kinds of assets could be invested by a 
peasant including riskless asset which return rate is fr and risk asset which return rate is r and weather derivatives 
which price is ( )b yp . Further, the price of agricultural product is p , sales volume is q and the primary asset the 
peasant owns is w . The utility of the best strategy the peasant could make is
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Where m is the amount of money the peasant invested in risk asset. 
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So we could have the maximal anticipant utility the peasant desires:
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But the anticipant return the peasant can hold when he buys weather derivatives is
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b b
f f
m
V MaxU w y r m r r pq R ydp d= - + - + +                                                                    (6)
Where the variabled is the amount of the weather derivatives the peasant has bought. Further, 
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So, we can have the following equation:
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We can hold the indifference price between the peasant buys the weather derivatives or not under the 
condition 1 2
b bV V= ,
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Where ( )R y is the gain from the contract and it is equal to the contractual price minus the cost y . Considering a 
future about weather derivatives, we then have 
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Then the price of future is 
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But we also can calculate the price of weather derivatives from the sellers’ opinion. At first, we don’t consider 
selling weather derivatives. Under the condition, the dominated strategy for the peasant is
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So, we have
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So we can hold the following equation:
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We can hold the indifference price ( )s yp for peasant as soon as 1 2
s sV V= . Where
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If the contract is put option and the due price is K, then due payoff is R(y)=Max(K-y) and then the indifference 
price is 
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4. Where index insurance is inappropriate
There are three aspects which could hinder and even lead to index insurance contracts not work well for all
agricultural producers. In highly spatially heterogeneous production areas, basis risk will likely be so high that index 
insurance will not work. Over-fitting the data is another concern with index insurance. If one has a limited amount 
of crop yield data, fitting the statistical relationship between the index and that limited data can become problematic. 
Finally, when designing index insurance contracts, significant care must be taken to assure that the insured has no 
better information about the likelihood and magnitude of loss than does the insurer. Farmers’ weather forecasts are 
quite often highly accurate. Potato farmers in Peru, using celestial observations and other indicators in nature, are 
able to forecast weather at least as well as many climate experts.
So it is the perquisite that insurance providers who venture into weather index insurance must know at least as 
much as farmers do about conditional weather forecasts because of that farmers have a vested interest in 
understanding the weather and climate. If not, inter-temporal adverse selection will render the index insurance 
product unsustainable.
5. Summary and conclusions
This article provides an overview of the traditional and the basic innovation approaches of agricultural insurance 
in risk transfer for natural hazards. Especially, the article mentions three aspects, at first, why traditional approaches 
to agricultural insurance are not appropriate for many lower-income countries that are dominated by a large number 
of small farms, then introduces innovations that use index-based insurance products, and gives a pricing model for 
weather index derivatives which is deduced with utility-based pricing, and then, the article reviews both the
advantages and disadvantages of index-based agricultural insurance and its applicable scope.
Some progress is being made in the implementation of index-based agricultural insurance products. India has
adopted a number of weather-based insurance products in recent years. Both the government agricultural insurer and 
private insurers are offering index insurance for weather risk in India. The World Bank and others are involved in a 
large number of feasibility studies to determine how such innovations can be introduced to ease the suffering and 
losses associated with weather related crop failure. A critical aspect of all of this thinking is the explicit recognition 
that many weather events impacted a large number of individuals at the same time creating larges losses. The need 
to transfer this type of correlated risk out of local communities is large. Index based weather insurance products can 
be a key ingredient in meeting that need. Nonetheless, in every case the adoption of these innovations must be put 
into a local context that explicitly recognizes the nature of the risk, the current risk-coping and risk management 
strategies of rural households, and the markets and institutions within the country.
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